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Abstract:  
 
Since the development of efficient proxies for taxes, many researchers have proved the 
existence of impact of tax on financing decisions. The ultimate aim of each business decision 
is to enhance the value of the firm; hence it is important to study the tax implications of 
financing decisions on the firm’s value. In this study an attempt is made to study the 
interrelationship between taxes, financing decisions and value of the firm. A panel data of 
188 Indian manufacturing firms over a period from 1990 to 2013 is employed to assess the 
relationship. Unlike the results of Fama and French (1998), the analyses undertaken in this 
study is able to capture the tax effects of debt. It shows clearly that companies consider 
partial consequences of employing debt and justify the higher use of debt. This study brings 
forth the empirical evidence that the personal tax implications flowing through financing 
decisions contribute towards forming perceptions of the investors and thus may affect the 
firm value in the opposite direction.  
Keywords: debt, equity, dividends, firm value, corporate tax, personal tax, panel data, fixed 
effects model  
JEL Codes: C 23, G32, G38 
1. Introduction:  
Tax consequence of different sources of finance forms one of the important considerations in 
firm’s financing decisions. Since interest paid on debt is tax deductible at the corporate level, 
hence debt appears to be a relatively cheaper source of finance. A company that has debt in 
the capital structure is expected to have a higher value (Modigliani 1963). But in 1977, Miller 
contradicted that firms pass out the debt - tax benefits to creditors through high interest rates 
to pay off for the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Therefore, different combinations of 
personal tax on interest, dividend and capital gain may affect the pricing of firm’s stock in 
various ways. Over the decades a lot of researchers from developed countries have rigorously 
studied the corporate tax advantage of debt but the role of personal taxes is highly 
underestimated. Similarly, there is an extensive theoretical literature on optimal capital 
structure. However, there is lack of conclusive empirical evidence on a relation between tax 
implications of various sources of finance and firm value.  
In India, like other emerging economies, this area is highly under-researched. There is not 
much empirical evidence revealing whether companies have any value maximising target 
capital structure or not. This is still an open question that whether it is only the corporate tax 
effect of debt or net effect of corporate and personal taxes that drives the value of the firms in 
India. Through this paper, an attempt is made to fill this gap by studying the interrelationship 
between taxes, capital structure decisions and value of the firm.  
The income tax in India is levied on the taxable income of all the entities in accordance with 
the provisions of Income Tax Act, 1961.  Interest on debt is deductible from the profits of 
business and is eligible for tax deduction. At the personal level, returns from debt accrue in the 
form of interest and that from equity in the form of dividend and capital gains. Progressive 
tax rate structure is applicable on the income of an individual investor and a flat rate of tax is 
applicable on the income of corporate investor. The Indian tax policies have undergone 
multiple changes over a period of time. During the period from 1989 to 1992, all the three 
forms of return were taxable in the hands of the individual investor at the rate applicable to 
him/her according to his/her tax bracket and in the hands of corporate investor at the 
applicable flat rate. Hence at the personal level, there was no advantage of investing in debt 
over equity or vice versa. Over a period of time, certain tax provisions were introduced which 
created differences in the tax treatment of the different forms of return in the hands of the 
investor. These changes led to variation in investor’s net marginal benefit from investment in 
debt and equity in different time periods. This might have had an impact on investor’s 
preference between debt and equity. 
Through this paper, it is proposed to study the interrelationship between taxes, financing 
decisions and value of the firm by adopting the models proposed by Fama and French (1998) 
by using panel data regression analysis. The models are selected after an in-depth review of 
existing literature, which is discussed in detail in the next section. The authors in their 
research carried out cross sectional regression analysis. They find a negative relation between 
interest (proxy for debt) and the firm value, on which the authors express that “imperfect 
controls for profitability probably drive the negative relations between debt and value and 
prevent the regressions from saying anything about the tax benefits of debt”. Kemsley and 
Nissim (2002) point out that one of the important reasons behind confusing results is the 
presence of certain unobservable effects which might be correlated with interest. Through the 
current study an attempt is made to address this shortcoming by employing panel data 
regression analysis with firm fixed effect. Accordingly, the data is analyzed for 188 Indian 
manufacturing companies for a period from 1990-2013. The results are evaluated along the 
lines of assumptions and hypothesis, framed according to the Indian tax rules and policies 
and changes therein.  
Section 2 undertakes an in-depth review of literature, section 3 discusses the Indian tax 
system in detail. Section 4 describes the model and the sample followed by the discussion on 
research methodology in section 5. Section 6 states assumption and hypothesis. In section 7 
empirical findings are discussed followed by conclusion in section 8. 
 
2. Review of literature:                    
This section is further divided into three parts. The first part reviews those researches which 
discuss the impact of corporate taxes on value; the second part discusses the literature on 
personal taxes and value of the firm; and the third part discusses the literature on the 
interrelationship between taxes, capital structure decisions, and value of the firm. 
2.1.  Corporate taxes and firm value 
Masulis (1980) analyses the exchange offers made by firms through the 1960s and 1970s. In 
exchange offers the practice was to retire one security for another and, thus, the author argues 
that in those offers there was mainly a change in the capital structure, while investment was 
not affected. The basic assumption in this study was that the firms’ capital structure was far 
from being optimum. Thus, he found a direct relationship between change in leverage and 
value of the firm. If the exchange increased the leverage for a firm, the value increased and 
vice versa.  
Myers (1984) comment on the assumptions made by Masulis (1980) for being unrealistic. 
The increase in leverage should not always increase the value of the firm, especially when the 
increase in leverage leads to moving away from the optimal capital structure. Graham, 
Hughson and Zender (1999) also support Myers’ view. 
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) found out that the cost of default was around 20% of the value of 
the firm whenever it was calculated after the default. Other authors note that the historic 
occurrence of default was low and thus the cost of debt was underestimated and, hence, 
Graham’s view of under-leveraged firms was not very appropriate. 
Graham (2000) derives marginal benefit functions by simulating interest deductions and by 
integrating under those functions. The author tries to approximate the reduction in the amount 
of tax at different levels of interest deductions as marginal tax benefit is a declining function 
of interest deductions. Thus, the author relates the incremental change in the value of the firm 
with the incremental change in interest deduction. The author reports that the tax benefits of 
debt amount to around 9-10% of the value of the firm and, thus, suggests that the firms in US 
are generally under-levered and coined the term ‘money left on the table’ by these firms. It is 
further noted in the research that if personal taxes are also considered, then the benefits are 
squeezed by around one-third.  
Lemon and Zender (2001) identified costs which are associated with trade off (such costs that 
are not directly associated with debt employment) and are large enough to set off the 
expected benefits associated with more debt employment and, thus, shows that the firms may 
in fact not be under-levered. A research work by Minton and Wruck (2001) also promotes the 
same idea. 
Mc Donald (2001) shows the tendency of the firms of giving up interest deductions as they 
write put or purchase calls on their shares. This activity of firms is similar to borrowing, with 
the only difference in the nature of the cash flows which leads to the inability of the firms to 
avail the tax deduction benefit. The authors, thus, reflect that the firms can actually increase 
the value by employing debt instead. 
Almieda and Phillipon (2007) reflect that the ‘money left on the table’ as proposed by 
Graham (2000) is roughly equal to the cost of distress. The author employs credit default 
spreads to calculate the risk neutral probabilities of default. The reason behind using credit 
default spreads is that in good times it is difficult to estimate such costs as distress is a feature 
of bad times when marginal utility of money is high. These risk neutral probabilities are then 
utilized to calculate the expected cost of distress and, thus, the author suggest that benefits of 
debt are overestimated. 
Graham and Tucker (2006) examined 44 tax shelter filings and found that there is a huge 
difference in the taxable income reported in the income tax filings and that in the financial 
statements. The income reported to tax authorities was much lower as compared to the 
income reported to other stakeholders due to certain other deductions which were equal to 
around 9% of the asset value. This may contribute towards the researches reporting firms 
being underleveraged and giving a false impression that value can be increased. 
2.2. Personal taxes and firm value 
Graham (2013) undertakes a detailed discussion about the assumptions that are hidden in 
researches testing the effect of personal taxes on capital structure decisions of firms. In these 
researches it is assumed that there is a marginal investor of each firm, depending upon its 
dividend payout ratio. Further, he states that this marginal investor owns both debt and equity 
and, thus, is the price setter for both types of securities. The assumptions are quiet unrealistic. 
But these assumptions become necessary in the light of the fact that the precise information 
regarding composition and tax status of investors is not available. Despite the obstacles, 
researchers have tried to identify the impact of personal taxes (investor’s preference based on 
their net benefit) on firm value.  
The impact of personal taxes has been tested mainly in the case of bonds. Poterba (1989) 
finds that the difference between the yield of taxable and non taxable bonds is equal to the 
highest statutory tax rate. Thus, according to him, the assumptions made by the investors are 
appropriate. But later, Green (1993) points out that there is also a possibility of receiving 
some return on taxable bonds in the form of capital gains and hence such bonds may not be 
fully taxable.   
To quote some more examples in favour of the assumptions made are research by Auerbach 
(1985). The author finds proof that investors match their tax status with the dividend price 
ratios of firms and thus form clienteles. Similarly, Seida and Wempe (2000) analyses the 
response of the investors to the 1986 tax reforms in the US. The investors realized their gains 
as they predicted a rise in the capital gain tax rate in such reforms. Another research on the 
same lines is that of Lang and Shackelord (2000). The author finds and reports that when 
information regarding lowering of capital gain tax was released, a boost occurred in the stock 
prices for firms which had the lowest dividend yield.   
2.3. Researches testing the impact of corporate taxes, personal taxes and firm value 
Masulis (1983) analysed the effect of changes in leverage and debt levels caused by exchange 
offers and recapitalization on firm value and stock returns. The author analysed 133 
successfully completed exchange offers that occurred in the US during the period 1963 to 
1978. The total sample includes 14 recapitalizations and 119 issuer exchange offers. These 
actions do not entail changes in the cash flows and, thus, would be able to capture the 
exclusive relationship between leverage and firm value. The author concludes that changes in 
leverage positively affected the change in the stock price and that the relationship between 
firm value and firm debt levels was found to be positive. The, evidence was in support of the 
optimal capital structure theory.  
Fama and French (1998) set up a model wherein they tried to control for profitability by 
using the variables earnings, investment, and research and development so as to isolate the 
tax effects inherent in interest and dividend. They made various variations to the basic model 
to capture the effects. The authors assumed negative pricing effect in dividends and positive 
sign for interest (debt) but could not find the results as expected and their model could not 
prove the stated hypothesis. Also, for dividends they document that there is a possibility of 
dividends are capturing the effects of profitability left by other variables. 
They found a negative relation between leverage and value, indicating that there are no net 
tax benefits of leverage and their results seem to support the Miller’s hypothesis. They 
suggest two possible causes for the same; one is the Miller’s tax effects and the other one is 
the agency problem that higher leverage and risky changes in leverage are not welcome by 
the investors, thus explaining the negative sign on the leverage variables. 
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) endeavoured to find out that whether the debt issuance 
decision is a static or a dynamic choice. The authors investigate its implications for optimal 
leverage ratios and extent of tax benefits of debt. The authors employ only debt increasing 
instances, ignoring debt reducing incidences and to support their argument say that due to the 
presence of transaction costs, the management is reluctant to decrease the debt cap. The 
authors propose a dynamic capital structure model where resulting optimal debt levels are 
found similar to those in reality and they find that dynamic models show that firms have 
larger tax benefits than what is predicted by static models; similarly they gave their argument 
in favour of upward restructuring. 
Kemsley and Nissim (2002) tried to solve the issues present in the research work of Fama and 
French (1998). The authors regressed earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) on the value 
with debt and debt variable, but the problem with this research work is that it may capture the 
effect of debt on earnings rather than the effect of earnings on debt. 
Chen and Gong (2012) tested the relationship between corporate taxes and market value and 
found a negative relationship between the two. The authors presented empirical evidence in 
the support of the non-linear relationship between corporate tax rates and market leverage 
and suggested that the trade off theory explains leverage decisions better. By using the 
estimates of MTR by Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010), the authors suggest that the taxes would 
be positively related to the value only to an extent and support the idea of a non-linear 
relationship between the two. The researchers also adjusted the MTR to account for personal 
tax disadvantage but there is no difference in the results achieved, leading to a conclusion that 
personal tax disadvantage is not large enough to affect the corporate tax disadvantage of debt. 
The researchers have employed various methods to test the effects of capital structure on a 
firm’s value, but the effects of personal and corporate taxes have been judged separately. 
There are very few cross sectional researches which have tested the effect of corporate and 
personal taxes taken together, which is the biggest challenge for the researchers to achieve. 
For the current study, the models proposed by Fama and French (1998) have been employed. 
 
3. The Indian Tax Policies 
The income tax in India is levied on the taxable income of all the entities in accordance with 
the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Income Tax Department is governed by Central Board of 
Direct Taxes (CBDT). CBDT is a part of the Department of Revenue under the Ministry of 
Finance, Government of India.  
The Income tax act of 1961 covers a wide range of taxes and has undergone multiple changes 
in the last 50 years. Listed below are the relevant tax provisions.  
i. Corporate income tax rate 
ii. Tax on interest income 
iii. Tax on dividend income 
iv. Tax on long term capital gain 
In India, interest paid on debt is deductible from the profits of business and is eligible for tax 
deduction. Hence at the corporate level, the tax advantage of debt is equal to the corporate 
income tax rate provided that the company earns enough to justify all the interest deductions. In 
India, corporate income tax rate is not progressive in nature and a flat rate is applicable to all 
business entities. The corporate income tax rate has undergone various reductions; it has been 
reduced from 50% in 1989-90 to 30% in 2010-11.   
At the personal level, progressive tax rate structure is applicable to an individual investor and 
a flat rate is applicable to a corporate investor. Returns from debt accrue in the form of 
interest and that from equity in the form of dividend and capital gains. During the period 
from 1989 to 1992, all the three forms of return were taxable in the hands of the individual 
investor at the rate applicable to him/her according to his/her tax bracket and in the hands of 
corporate investor at the applicable flat rate. Thus, at the personal level, there was no 
advantage of investing in debt over equity or vice versa. Over a period of time, certain tax 
provisions were introduced which created differences in the tax treatment of the different 
forms of return in the hands of the investor.  
In India, interest (return on debt) is tax deductible at the corporate level but is taxable in the 
hands of the investor according to his tax bracket. Since 1989, a lot of changes have occurred 
in the personal tax rates also, during the period 1989-1992, there were four slabs with the tax 
rate applicable to the highest slab being 50%. In the current scenario there are three slabs 
with the highest tax rate being 30%.  
Dividend income was taxable in the hands of the investor till the year 1997. After that a 
Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) was introduced, according to which a company distributing 
dividends had to pay tax to the government. The amount of tax to be paid is a fixed 
percentage of dividends being distributed to the investors. Thus, despite the fact that at the 
personal level an investor may be completely tax exempt, his dividend income was reduced 
by the amount of tax paid by the company. The DDT was withdrawn for the year 2002-2003, 
but was reintroduced from the year 2003-2004 and is applicable till date. The rate of DDT 
has been revised from time to time.  
The tax on long term capital gains (LTCG) accrues in the hands of the investor when he/she 
holds the security for more than a year. In the previous year 1992-1993, LTCG tax was 
introduced, according to which irrespective of the tax rate applicable to the individual, a flat 
charge of 20% was applicable on the long term capital gains earned by an assessee. The rule 
continued and remained same till the year 2003-2004. In the year 2004-2005, a Securities 
Transaction Tax (STT) was introduced according to which a minor tax rate of 0.125% was 
chargeable on the total amount of the transaction each time a security was bought or sold. In 
accordance with the relevant section, the assessee who pays the STT is exempt from the long 
term capital gain tax. 
These changes form the basis for applicability of a particular assumption or hypothesis during 
a time period. In the next section the model and the sample are discussed. 
 
4. The model and the sample 
To study the interrelationship between taxes, financing decisions and value of the firm, the 
models proposed by Fama and French (1998) are employed. The model was constructed by 
the authors assuming that the market value of the firm is equal to an all equity no dividend 
firm plus the tax effects associated with interest and dividend payments. The authors  
presume that if the earning and investment variables account for all the information about the 
expected net cash flows in financing decisions, the coefficient on financing variables would 
reveal the tax effects. 
In line with the propositions of Fama and French (1998), in this analysis it is expected that 
after controlling for investor sentiments related to the earnings and future growth prospects, 
the coefficients on the dividend and interest variables would only capture the personal choice 
of the investor. It is presumed that the personal choice of the investor would depend upon the 
difference in the net after tax return from two sources of finance.  
In line with the above mentioned work, two indicators for dependent variables (value of the 
firm) are employed in the regression analysis. One of the measures is spread of the value over 
cost, where value is the market cap and cost is the total assets (book value); another variable 
is a two year change in spread. The explanatory variables include past, current and future 
values of earning, investment (assets), research and development expenditure, dividend and 
interest. All the variables used in the study are scaled down by total assets. 
 
4.1. The Model 
Fama and French (1998) employ eight models with minor differences to test the relationship 
between taxes and value of the firm. In this study the following four models are adopted to 
undertake the proposed analyses. 
𝑀𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽12𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  ( ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝐷𝑗)  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (1) 
𝑀𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽12𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  ( ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝐷𝑗)  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (2) 
𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑀𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  ( ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝐷𝑗)  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (3) 
𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑀𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  ( ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝐷𝑗)  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (4) 
 
 
Where: 
i = firm 1 to 188, and, 
t = year 1992 to 2011. 
j = firm 2 to 188  
i. = Market return for firm i in year t (current year) 
ii. = Change in market return from year (t-2) to t for firm i  
iii.  = Profit after tax but before interest for firm i in year t 
iv. = Change in profit after tax from year (t-2) to t for firm i   
v. = Expected change in profit after tax from year t to (t+2) for firm i 
vi. = Profit before tax for firm i in year t (current year) 
vii. = Change in profit before tax from year (t-2) to t for firm i 
viii. = Expected change in profit before tax from year t to (t+2) for firm i 
ix. = Change in total assets from year (t-2) to t for firm i 
x. = Expected change in total assets from year t to (t+2) for firm i 
xi. = Research and development expenditure for firm i in year t 
xii. = Change in research and development expenditure from year (t-2) to t for firm i 
xiii. = Expected change in research and development expenditure from year t to (t+2) 
for firm i 
xiv. = Interest expense for firm i in year t 
xv. = Change in interest expense from year (t-2) to t for firm i  
xvi. = Expected change in interest expense from year t to (t+2) for firm i 
xvii. = Dividend expense for firm i in year t 
xviii. = Change in dividend from year (t-2) to t for firm i 
xix. = Expected change in dividend from year t to (t+2) for firm i 
xx. = Expected change in market capitalization from year t to (t+2) for firm i 
xxi. is a dummy variable for each firm to add cross sectional fixed effects 
xxii.  is a stochastic error term                                                                        
The dummy variables have been added to include cross sectional fixed effects in the model. 
Since the model has intercept term , the number of dummy variables in the model will be 1 
less than the total number of firms. Therefore, subscript j= 2,3,..........number of firms 
The first two models regress market return on past, current and future values of earnings, 
investment and financing variables, and the next two models regress two year change in 
market return on the past and future values of the above mentioned items. Models 1 and 3 
control for after tax profits, whereas the other two models control for pre tax earnings (in all 
the models earnings imply earnings before interest). Formulas for all the variables are 
presented in Appendix. 
 
4.2. The sample size and the time period 
For the purpose of this analysis, data on 188 manufacturing firms is employed for a period 
from 1990 to 2013. The basis of choosing the sample for above analyses is the uninterrupted 
data availability on market value of firm. Since a longer time period was required, hence only 
those firms are considered for which the complete data was available beginning from 1990 
till 2013. It is important to mention here that regression analysis is undertaken from the 
period 1992 to 2011 because the models include change variables also, hence additional two 
years past and future data sets were required.  On the basis of introduction/amendment of 
important tax policies, the total sample period is divided into three sub periods that is from 
1992-1997, 1998-2005 and 2006-2011.  
5. Research Methodology 
Using all the identified variables explained in Section 4.1 above, least square panel data 
regression analysis, with firm fixed effects (wherever applicable) is undertaken.  
A test based on the techniques proposed by Im Pesaran and Shin and Levin Lin and Chu is 
employed to test whether the series are stationary or not. The choice for these tests is due to 
the fact that the panel under the current study is of the type where N > T and is based on the 
study by Choi (2001). All the variables are found to be stationary at level. To test for 
presence of multicollinearity amongst the variables, cross correlation matrix is used. No 
multicollinearity was found amongst the variables. White (1980) period method is employed 
to obtain heteroskadastic-consistent standard errors. 
 
6. Assumptions and Hypotheses 
In employing the model proposed by Fama and French (1998), the underlying assumptions 
are: That all the information contained in net cash flows is captured; the future and past 
values of the variables proxy for expected net cash flows are available; two year expected 
change in market cap proxy for other effects on market value are available; after controlling 
for other effects, the coefficients on interest and dividend variables will capture the tax 
effects on value of the firm. 
6.1. Underlying Assumptions 
To undertake this analysis certain assumptions are made which are listed below: 
Assumption 1: The tax rate applicable to the debt or equity return, when chargeable in the 
hands of the investor, is the tax rate applicable to the highest income slab as per Indian 
Income Tax Act. 
Assumption 2 (a): The shareholder is also the debenture holder, 
The debenture holder is also presumed to be the equity shareholder and since an investor 
would compare his/her return after tax on investment either in debt and equity, therefore, the 
hypothesis would be based on investor’s advantage in investing in debt or equity.  
Alternatively 
Assumption 2 (b): The shareholder and debenture holders are separate from each other. 
Under this assumption the relationship of dividend and interest with value would be 
determined independently.  
In this case the propositions of Brennan and Schwartz (1984) and Miller and Scholes (1978) 
are taken into consideration and thus it is expected that the coefficient on the dividend 
variable would depend upon the tax rate on dividend in comparison to the capital gain for the 
shareholder. If the tax on dividend is greater than the tax on capital gain, then dividend would 
bear a negative sign else dividend would bear a positive sign. 
According to the Indian tax code, even after considering the tax rate applicable to the highest 
tax slab as the debenture holder’s tax incidence, there is always a positive tax advantage 
associated with the issuance of debt as the corporate tax rate is always greater or equal to the 
tax rate applicable to the highest income slab of the individual. In case the tax rate on 
corporate income is greater than the assumed personal tax liability, the variable might turn 
out to be insignificant but, under this assumption, the coefficient would never bear a negative 
sign. 
 
6.2. Hypotheses1  
The following hypothesis would be tested to understand the tax implications of financing 
decisions on the value of the firm: 
6.2.1. Hypothesis based on assumptions employed 
Assumption 1, in the Indian context, implies that net after tax return on equity is greater than the 
net after tax return on debt since 1993, when long term capital gain was introduced. Thus, the 
hypotheses that follow from assumption 1 and 2(a) are as follows: 
H0,1:  There is a positive relationship between dividend and the value of the firm.  
H0,2:  There is a negative relationship between interest and the value of the firm. 
Under assumptions 1 and 2(b) the following hypothesis would follow: 
H0,3a: There is a negative relationship between dividend and the value of the firm.  
H0,3b: There is a positive relationship between dividend and the value of the firm.  
During the times when tax on dividend is greater than tax on capital gain, hypothesis 3a 
would follow and in the opposite circumstance, hypothesis 3b would follow. 
                                                 
1 The hypotheses are based on the sign of the coefficient of the independent variable in the regression model. 
Hypothesis related to interest is as follows: 
H0,4: There is a positive relationship between interest and the value of the firm. 
 
6.2.2. Hypothesis based upon different variables employed to control for the impact of 
earnings on firm value 
Fama and French (1998) had controlled both for profit after taxes and profit before taxes as 
this does make a difference and in their study have compared the relationship between 
leverage and firm value under both the Modigliani (1963) and Miller (1977) assumptions. 
The implications that follow from their work are summarized in the table 1 below: 
Table 1: Comparison of implications that flow from the assumptions made by 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miller (1977) about the effect of taxes on firm value 
under two different cases; the difference lies in the measure (PAT or PBT) used to 
control for earnings. 
Variable used for 
controlling the effects of 
earnings on firm value 
Profit before tax (same for 
levered and unlevered firm) 
Profit after tax 
(same for levered and unlevered 
firm) 
According to the theory 
proposed by Millers  
(1977)  
No relation between debt and 
value 
Levered firms have lower value 
(higher the interest paid lower 
would be the value of the firm) 
According to the theory 
proposed by Modigliani  
    ( 1963)  
Levered firms have higher value 
because of the corporate tax 
advantage. 
No relation between debt and value 
 
As it is mentioned by De Mooij (2011) that it is important to include the impact of personal 
taxes, therefore, for the present study the tax implications of leverage would be tested only 
according to the theory proposed by Miller (1977) under the two different cases. According 
to Miller’s proposition, firms that employ higher debt have lower value. Hence, the following 
null hypotheses follow under two different scenarios:  
Case I:  When the effect of earnings on firm value is controlled through PAT. 
H0,5: There is a negative relationship between interest and the firm value. 
H0,6: There is a positive relationship between dividend and the firm value. 
Case II:  When the effect of earnings on firm value is controlled through PBT. 
H0,7: There is a no relationship between interest and the firm value. 
H0,8: There is a no relationship between dividend and the firm value. 
 
6.2.3. Hypothesis based upon difference in the dependent variable 
The change in market return to proxy for the firm value in place of market return is expected 
to capture the unexpected effects of information not known two years before. In this study 
also, an attempt is made to account for these effects and, thus, the following hypothesis: 
H0,9: There is difference in the results when change in market return is regressed in place of 
market return.  
6.2.4. Hypothesis for the sub periods  
The total period for analysis from 1992-2011 has been divided into the following three sub 
periods on the basis of timing of tax law changes. These changes have been described in 
section 3 above.  
 1992-1997 
 1998-2005 
 2006-2011 
Table 2 shows the hypotheses for aggregate and sub periods in the summary form under 
assumptions 2(a) and 2(b) described above. 
 
 
Table 2: Hypothesised relationship between tax effects expected to be captured through interest 
and dividend variables and value of the firm. 
Year Relationship between tax effects of 
interest and firm value 
Relationship between tax effects of 
dividend and firm value 
Assumption 2(a) 
1992-2011 Negative  Positive 
1992-1997 Negative Positive 
1998-2005 Negative  Positive 
2006-2011 Negative Positive 
Assumption 2(b)  
1992-2011 Positive Positive 
1992-1997 Positive  Investor is Indifferent so insignificant or negative 
1998-2005 Positive Positive  
2006-2011 Positive Positive 
 
Under the two assumptions described above, the difference in the tax impacts of interest is 
very clearly shown in Table 2. When the shareholder is also the debenture holder, his after 
tax return from equity is higher in comparison to debt. Hence, under this assumption, interest 
is expected to have a negative sign and under another assumption, as personal taxes do not 
completely wipe out the corporate tax advantage of debt, higher debt is expected to add to the 
wealth of the shareholders and, therefore, interest variable is expected to have a positive 
impact on the value of the firm.  
Under both the assumptions, dividend is expected to have a positive sign. Under the first 
assumption [2(a)], return on equity in comparison to debt would be higher and under the 
second assumption, as tax on dividend was always lower than the tax on capital gain (except 
during the period 1992-1997), it is expected that there is a positive relationship between 
dividend and value of the firm. During the period 1992-1997, based on assumption 1, it was 
hypothesized that either there will be no effect of dividend on firm value or it would have a 
positive sign.    
In the next section, empirical findings are discussed.  
 
7. Empirical findings 
Tables 3 to 6 present the regression results and are placed in appendix at the end of the 
chapter. The discussion on the results is divided into four sections:  
i. Results of aggregate analysis over the total sample period; 
ii. Comparative analyses of regressions controlling for profit after tax and profit before 
tax; 
iii. Comparative analyses of difference in regressions results on the basis of difference in 
dependent variable; 
iv. Results of analysis over the sub periods. 
 
7.1. Results of aggregate analysis over the total sample period 
7.1.1. Results for tax effects captured through interest variables 
 Current year interest variable (INT): 
Coefficients on current year interest variable, whenever significant, are positive. This result is 
in line with the alternate assumption [2(b)]. Positive coefficient on the current year interest 
variable also shows the presence of net tax advantage of debt which has an effect of 
increasing the value of the firm, as due to the presence of debt the managers are able to 
generate higher earnings per share for the shareholders.      
Another view and justification for the presence of positive coefficients is inferred from the 
interpretation of results arrived at by Fama and French (1998). Accordingly, the positive 
coefficient on the current year interest variable is understood to capture the effects of 
earnings which may have been left by other variables.  
 Change in interest from past two years (BCHINT) 
It is observed that whenever significant, the results are in line with the primary assumption 
[2(a)], accordingly the coefficient on this variable is negative. This suggests that an increase 
in interest is perceived negatively by the investors. This may happen due to two reasons. One 
reason originates from the primary assumption made in this study. In line with this 
assumption, as the investor is able to fetch a higher net after tax return on equity, he would 
prefer equity over debt.  
Also, increase in debt increases the probability of financial distress in low times. Thus the 
results show the importance of marginal tax advantage of debt. The results clearly bring out 
the importance of precise calculation of tax advantage associated with debt and therefore, the 
negative perception of the investor with the inappropriate increase in debt.   
 Expected change in interest over the next two years (FCHINT) 
Forward change in interest is not found to be significant in any of the regressions, this shows 
that expected increase or decrease in leverage does not affect the current market price of the 
firm. 
On the basis of the above discussion, we may say that current year interest variable captures 
the advantages generated at the corporate level and change variable captures the sentiments 
of the investors. Future possibilities of increase in debt do not affect the market value of the 
firm. 
 
7.1.2. Results of tax effects captured through dividend variable 
 Current year dividend variable (DIV) 
Under both the assumptions, the tax law in relation to dividend is such that it is expected to 
positively affect the market value of Indian companies. As hypothesized, current year 
dividend variable contains a positive coefficient whenever it is found to be significant.   
 Change in dividend from past two years (BCHDIV) 
Change in dividend from the past value also bears the positive sign, whenever it is found 
significant. 
 Expected change in interest over the next two years (FCHDIV): 
Expected change in dividend is not found significant in any of the regressions except one and 
bears the positive coefficient. 
Hence, dividend variable is always in line with the hypothesis made. 
 
7.2. Comparative analyses of regression models controlling for variables profit after tax 
and profit before tax  
According to Miller’s proposition, if the effects of earnings on firm value are controlled 
through profit before tax, then there should not be any relation between financing variables 
and firm value. But if the effects are controlled through profit after tax then the levered firms 
are expected to have lower value.  
Our results do not differentiate between control for PAT or PBT. Except the minor difference 
in the value of the coefficients there is no other difference between the two types of 
regressions.  
 
7.3. Comparative analyses of difference in regressions results on the basis of difference 
in dependent variable  
Market return is regressed on all current, past and future variables, and change in market 
return variable is regressed on only past and future variables. The results suggest that current 
and past interest variables and current and expected dividend variables significantly affect the 
market return. Only past dividend variables significantly affect the change in market return. 
Interest does not affect the change in market return in any of the regressions. 
 
7.4. Results of analysis over the sub periods 
Current interest variable and backward change in interest variable are found significant in 
only those equations that regress market return; interest variables were not found significant 
in equations regressing change in market return. Amongst all the sub periods, the variable 
was not found significant during the period 1998-2005. The reason behind such a result is due 
to the fact that during this period the aggregate debt was near constant, therefore, interest or 
changes in interest may not have affected the value of the firm during this period. Future 
interest variable is not found significant in any regression analyses. 
In the equations regressing market return, current dividend variable is found significant only 
during the period 2006-2011. Past dividend variable is not found significant in any of the 
regressions and future dividend variable is not found significant in any of the sub period 
regressions. In the equations regressing change in market return, past dividend variable is not 
found significant only during the period 1992-1997 and future dividend variable is not found 
significant in any of the regression analyses.     
  
8. Conclusion 
Unlike the findings of Fama and French (1998), the results suggest that interest and dividend 
variables are able to capture the impact of tax effects on the value of the firm. The result in 
tables 3 and 4 column A, B and D reflects that employment of more debt is perceived 
negatively by the investors and affects the value of the firm negatively. The results indicate 
that firms may justify the higher use of debt by focussing on the statutory corporate tax rate 
or marginal tax advantage of debt, but reduced benefit due to change in tax policies affecting 
the net return of the investor affects the investor sentiments negatively which is reflected 
through the value of the firm. No difference is found between regressions controlling for PAT 
or PBT. There is a difference in results when the change in market return is regressed in place 
of market return on the relevant variables, i.e., the results suggest that current year market 
return does capture the impact of tax effect but change in market return does not capture the 
tax effects. Hence, researchers are advised to employ the current year market return or firm 
value to test the impact of tax effects associated with financing variables on the value of the 
firm. This study highlights the role of personal taxes in determining the value of the firm and the 
financing decisions. The results support the view that researchers and managers must take into 
account net tax effects of financing decisions. The results arrived at by this research is a major 
contribution to the existing knowledge as no cross sectional or panel study could clearly test and 
prove the tax effects of financing decisions on the value of the firm. This study also provides the 
empirical evidence and highlights the importance of personal taxes in determination of the capital 
structure and value of the firm.  
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Appendix 
A. Tables for regression results  
Table 3: Regression results of Model 1 
Years 1992-2011 1992-1997 1998-2005 2006-2011 
Effects  
Specification 
Cross-section  
fixed (dummy  
variables) 
Cross-section  
fixed (dummy  
variables) 
Cross-section  
fixed (dummy  
variables) 
Cross-section  
fixed (dummy  
variables) 
Dependent variable MKRETit 
C 
-0.21896** 
(0.099072) 
-0.73969* 
(0.285315) 
-0.01334 
(0.094581) 
0.057353 
(0.142547) 
PATit 
0.586912 
(0.60748) 
5.031791** 
(2.086115) 
0.476047 
(0.66928) 
0.82066 
(0.69509) 
BCHPATit 
0.961345* 
(0.240307) 
-0.3035 
(0.80242) 
0.442295 
(0.308853) 
0.067305 
(0.22) 
FCHPATit 
0.792789 
(0.416027) 
1.760429** 
(0.846955) 
0.599793 
(0.536619) 
0.622938 
(0.320707) 
BCHTAit 
0.244294** 
(0.120453) 
0.495012** 
(0.212179) 
0.157905 
(0.103682) 
0.025917 
(0.071933) 
FCHTAit 
0.620637* 
(0.121213) 
0.317859 
(0.207499) 
0.881036* 
(0.271817) 
0.544093* 
(0.07532) 
RDit 
-13.6297 
(10.794) 
-63.2683* 
(22.04768) 
14.02788 
(11.33433) 
-28.2587 
(21.31798) 
BCHRDit 
12.57765* 
(4.387624) 
41.60032* 
(11.67642) 
-1.62976 
(4.958048) 
18.46545 
(11.92137) 
FCHRDit 
-3.72062 
(4.839047) 
-21.12 
(11.73527) 
-2.36655 
(4.083225) 
-2.05377 
(9.075948) 
INTit 
6.018094* 
(1.321796) 
8.532627* 
(3.028287) 
-0.77317 
(1.660146) 
5.253619** 
(2.312749) 
BCHINTit 
-2.5307* 
(0.823658) 
-4.16454** 
(1.864118) 
-0.24126 
(0.702354) 
-2.66394** 
(1.074499) 
FCHINTit 
0.755724 
(0.722454) 
1.373441 
(1.381699) 
-0.94262 
(1.042672) 
-0.2702 
(0.976111) 
DIVit 
9.982* 
(3.682441) 
23.0236 
(12.94998) 
1.119028 
(3.19835) 
10.48369** 
(5.070414) 
BCHDIVit 
-0.43035 
(3.779088) 
-5.15973 
(11.43632) 
1.536973 
(3.23925) 
-0.00577 
(3.054529) 
FCHDIVit 
2.243003** 
(0.985097) 
9.075678 
(6.710133) 
-0.37843 
(0.926656) 
0.646755 
(1.993016) 
FCHMCAPit 
-0.23117* 
(0.072537) 
-0.22231* 
(0.077241) 
-0.31776* 
(0.053339) 
-0.41209* 
(0.048743) 
R-squared 0.666554 0.77497 0.813149 0.909306 
Adjusted R-squared 0.647618 0.725829 0.784138 0.889501 
F-statistic 35.2* 15.77015* 28.02857* 45.91176* 
Note: * Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level, standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Table 4: Regression results of Model 2 
Years 1992-2011 1992-1997 1998-2005 2006-2011 
Effects 
Specification 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
Dependent variable  MKRETit 
C 
-0.217617** 
(0.09842) 
-0.74024* 
(0.285144) 
-0.01584 
(0.095233) 
0.068581 
(0.141827) 
PBTit 
0.620248 
(0.612096) 
5.108063** 
(2.095288) 
0.664361 
(0.680532) 
0.673164 
(0.6649) 
BCHPBTit 
1.035035* 
(0.23292) 
-0.31586 
(0.803136) 
0.48736 
(0.318859) 
0.146897 
(0.209593) 
FCHPBTit 
0.849308** 
(0.431283) 
1.791159** 
(0.849244) 
0.69428 
(0.545142) 
0.567383 
(0.325207) 
BCHTAit 
0.237575** 
(0.117987) 
0.491262** 
(0.211213) 
0.144527 
(0.104263) 
0.022248 
(0.071056) 
FCHTAit 
0.617027* 
(0.120447) 
0.315251 
(0.208105) 
0.875308* 
(0.268971) 
0.550242* 
(0.076095) 
RDit 
-13.20352 
(10.81427) 
-63.2281* 
(22.0327) 
14.07051 
(11.24299) 
-28.2134 
(21.24724) 
BCHRDit 
12.32857* 
(4.399278) 
41.58811* 
(11.68045) 
-1.64234 
(4.910218) 
18.48327 
(11.89683) 
FCHRDit 
-3.756327 
(4.81986) 
-21.1348 
(11.73248) 
-2.46292 
(4.067912) 
-2.1691 
(9.085208) 
INTit 
5.959873* 
(1.327483) 
8.459708* 
(3.037408) 
-0.84818 
(1.644047) 
5.180969** 
(2.31099) 
BCHINTit 
-2.456038* 
(0.82539) 
-4.12449** 
(1.868261) 
-0.17591 
(0.697054) 
-2.58943** 
(1.095386) 
FCHINTit 
0.722225 
(0.718828) 
1.36151 
(1.382002) 
-0.97943 
(1.037742) 
-0.25303 
(0.965749) 
DIVit 
9.919198* 
(3.689468) 
22.90618 
(12.96877) 
0.942897 
(3.143702) 
10.53015** 
(5.080483) 
BCHDIVit 
-0.44433 
(3.769429) 
-5.13867 
(11.43711) 
1.482336 
(3.211671) 
-0.02844 
(3.045169) 
FCHDIVit 
2.207177** 
(0.985231) 
9.031365 
(6.685282) 
-0.48242 
(0.93572) 
0.662174 
(1.99953) 
FCHMCAPit 
-0.231208* 
(0.072694) 
-0.22257* 
(0.077151) 
-0.31793* 
(0.05338) 
-0.41167* 
(0.049015) 
R-squared 0.667074 0.77515 0.813649 0.909186 
Adjusted R- quared 0.648167 0.726047 0.784715 0.889354 
F-statistic 35.28239* 15.78637* 28.12099* 45.84475* 
Note: * Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level, standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Table 5: Regression results of Model 3 
Years 1992-2011 1992-1997 1998-2005 2006-2011 
Effects 
Specification 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
No Effects 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
Dependent 
variable 
BCHMKRETit 
C 
-0.00345 
(0.038763) 
-0.14119** 
(0.071868) 
-0.03126 
(0.044072) 
0.109131** 
(0.050503) 
BCHPATit 
0.782688 
(0.449697) 
3.26203* 
(1.201557) 
0.764484 
(0.526107) 
-0.021 
(0.351646) 
FCHPATit 
0.058152 
(0.349367) 
0.447168 
(0.749438) 
0.752158 
(0.484415) 
-0.1871 
(0.310258) 
BCHTAit 
-0.16436 
(0.134238) 
0.13028 
(0.21294) 
-0.05097 
(0.16753) 
-0.31768 
(0.201524) 
FCHTAit 
0.463031* 
(0.137161) 
0.072766 
(0.206019) 
0.653101** 
(0.287258) 
0.712848* 
(0.094061) 
BCHRDit 
8.905014 
(5.937004) 
18.79135** 
(9.35211) 
14.16933 
(10.98664) 
2.034382 
(8.668413) 
FCHRDit 
-2.72572 
(4.847847) 
-2.26382 
(8.473267) 
-5.87761 
(5.5464) 
10.42972 
(10.54779) 
BCHINTit 
0.889305 
(0.934112) 
-1.02318 
(2.065649) 
0.075721 
(0.873844) 
1.976787 
(1.939323) 
FCHINTit 
0.073342 
(0.645003) 
0.19387 
(1.468216) 
0.38109 
(1.037707) 
0.641242 
(1.12879) 
BCHDIVit 
9.519518* 
(3.348316) 
17.60231 
(12.84773) 
7.604146** 
(3.688786) 
8.596367* 
(3.117356) 
FCHDIVit 
2.67133 
(2.138773) 
11.86572 
(8.721616) 
0.667631 
(1.89826) 
-0.07143 
(1.580018) 
FCHMCAPit 
-0.13238 
(0.074698) 
-0.02049 
(0.06631) 
-0.20492* 
(0.055029) 
-0.51011* 
(0.056203) 
R-squared 0.197843 0.141423 0.2858 0.583363 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.153241 0.13296 0.177439 0.494564 
F-statistic 4.435765* 16.71134* 2.63747* 6.569484* 
Note: * Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level, standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
  
Table 6: Regression results of Model 4 
Years 1992-2011 1992-1997 1998-2005 2006-2011 
Effects 
Specification 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
No Effects 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
Cross-section 
fixed (dummy 
variables) 
Dependent 
variable 
BCHMKRETit 
C 
-0.00264 
(0.038604) 
-0.14084** 
(0.071699) 
-0.02606 
(0.043464) 
0.110651** 
(0.050795) 
BCHPBTit 
0.852683 
(0.47835) 
3.277093* 
(1.199551) 
0.985797 
(0.557626) 
0.009794 
(0.37457) 
FCHPBTit 
0.012319 
(0.370393) 
0.435167 
(0.751856) 
0.837433 
(0.49302) 
-0.24366 
(0.325022) 
BCHTAit 
-0.1722 
(0.133035) 
0.127824 
(0.211568) 
-0.07489 
(0.163636) 
-0.32113 
(0.198299) 
FCHTAit 
0.465048* 
(0.136628) 
0.073387 
(0.205003) 
0.647101** 
(0.286098) 
0.712868* 
(0.093816) 
BCHRDit 
8.888448 
(5.912099) 
18.80905** 
(9.349188) 
14.50882 
(10.99446) 
2.010592 
(8.585619) 
FCHRDit 
-2.80949 
(4.841442) 
-2.26528 
(8.469943) 
-5.91079 
(5.51227) 
10.22306 
(10.54256) 
BCHINTit 
0.936253 
(0.913185) 
-1.02457 
(2.065736) 
0.25005 
(0.869352) 
1.940326 
(1.852959) 
FCHINTit 
0.06091 
(0.648376) 
0.199146 
(1.472778) 
0.433482 
(1.035001) 
0.610905 
(1.125203) 
BCHDIVit 
9.494126* 
(3.335609) 
17.59973 
(12.84342) 
7.388997** 
(3.662695) 
8.555803* 
(3.104338) 
FCHDIVit 
2.687087 
(2.144943) 
11.86507 
(8.725374) 
0.564554 
(1.899901) 
-0.06138 
(1.574995) 
FCHMCAPit 
-0.13167 
(0.074629) 
-0.02038 
(0.066385) 
-0.2059* 
(0.05498) 
-0.50891* 
(0.05629) 
R-squared 0.198515 0.141619 0.287762 0.5836 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.153951 0.133159 0.179699 0.494851 
F-statistic 4.454568* 16.73841* 2.662896* 6.575887* 
Note: * Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level, standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
B. Formulas 
1. Current year market return (MKRET): 
𝑀𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑇 = (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡  
 
2. Change in market return from past two years (BCHMKRET): 
𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑀𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑇 = [(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡
− (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡−2]/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡  
 
3. Profit after tax but before interest (PAT): 
𝑃𝐴𝑇 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡   
 
4. Change in profit after tax from the past two years (BCHPAT): 
𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑇 = (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡−2)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡   
  
 
5. Expected two year change in profit after tax (FCHPAT): 
𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐴𝑇 = (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡+2 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡  
 
6. Profit before tax (PBT): 
𝑃𝐵𝑇 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 
 
 
7. Change in profit before tax from the past two years (BCHPBT):  
𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐵𝑇 = (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡−2)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡    
  
 
8. Expected two year change in profit before tax (FCHPBT): 
𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑃𝐵𝑇 = (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡+2 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 
 
9. Change in total assets from the past two years (BCHTA): 
𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴 = (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−2)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡  
 
10. Expected two year change in total assets (FCHTA): 
𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴 = (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+2 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡  
 
11. Current year expenditure on research and development (RD): 
𝑅𝐷 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 
 
12. Change in research and development expenditure from the past two years (BCHRD): 
𝐵𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷 = (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 −
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−2)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 =  
 
13. Expected two year change in research and development expenditure (FCHRD): 
𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐷 = (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡+2
− 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡  
 
14. Current interest expense (INT): 
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 
 
15. Change in interest expense from the past two years (BCHINT): 
𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇 = (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−2)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡   
 
16. Expected two year change in interest expense (FCHINT): 
𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑇 = (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡+2 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡   
 
17. Current year dividend expense (DIV): 
𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡  
 
18. Change in dividend from the past two years (BCHDIV): 
𝐵𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉 = (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−2)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡   
 
19. Expected two year change in dividend (FCHDIV): 
𝐹𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉 = (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡+2 − 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 
 
20. Expected two year change in market cap (FCHMCAP): 
𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 = (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡+2 − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡)/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡  
 
Here t represents the current year. 
 
